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Remedies when a tenant profits from unlawful sub-lease on 
Airbnb: Nice Place Property Management v Paterson 
Abstract 
In Nice Place Property Management Ltd v Paterson,1 a New Zealand court 
recently ordered a tenant to pay the landlord the roughly $7,500 NZ profit 
that the tenant had made while sub-letting the premises via Airbnb in 
breach of their lease. The orthodox position is that an account of profit for 
breach of contract is available only in exceptional cases. We argue that 
Nice Place is not such an exceptional case. However, we suggest that a 
court could make an award of “negotiating damages”, which are 
compensatory in nature, to reflect the landlord’s loss of right to control 
their land. This approach could result in a sum less than, or possibly more 








In Nice Place Property Management Ltd v Paterson (Nice Place),2 a New Zealand court 
recently ordered a tenant to pay their landlord the roughly $7,500 NZ profit that the 
tenant had made while sub-letting the premises via Airbnb in breach of the lease. An 
award of account of profits for breach of contract is generally considered to be available 
only in exceptional cases, but tenants sub-letting in breach of their tenancy agreement is 
hardly a new problem. Thus, the decision is worth scrutinising. 
 
We begin by clarifying the terminology of “restitutionary damages” and “account 
of profit” in contract, before outlining the orthodox position on the availability of such 
damages for breach of contract. Then, we consider if the award in Nice Place is 
consistent with the orthodox position. We suggest that the court’s rationale for granting 
 
1 [2018] NZDC 20936. 
2 [2018] NZDC 20936. 
an account of profit cannot be reconciled with the case law, and consider alternative 
rationales for the outcome. In particular, we explore the idea that a court could make an 
award of “negotiating damages”, a compensatory award sometimes mistakenly thought 
of as being, or akin to, an account of profit. 
 
2. “Restitutionary damages” and “account of profit” 
Typically, “restitutionary” remedies are concerned with making the defendant give 
something up to the plaintiff. The label “restitution” is often used when the thing that 
defendant must give up was originally held by the plaintiff. A classic example is where a 
plaintiff made a mistaken payment that the defendant must return. In such a case the 
“giving up” could also be described as “giving back”. 
 
Consider a common contract law scenario: the defendant, in breach, has 
supplied the plaintiff goods of sub-standard quality. The plaintiff sues for damages to 
reflect the difference between the value of the goods that were promised and the value 
of the goods that were provided. It would be possible to describe this award as 
“restitution” in the sense that the defendant is “giving back” some of the purchase price 
to the plaintiff. However, the use of the language of “restitution” is unhelpful. The result 
here is best explained as the simple result of standard contract law remedies principles 
aimed at meeting the plaintiff’s loss.3  
 
The language of “restitutionary” remedies is meaningful in contract law when 
describing the case where a defendant is forced to “give up” something that the plaintiff 
never had in the first place. It is in this sense that the Court in Nice Place could be said to 
have ordered restitution: the tenant was required to give up the profit that they had 
made from sub-letting the premises. This was not a “giving back” because the landlord 
had never themself had that profit. This kind of remedy can be described as an “account 
of profit”4 and, for the avoidance of doubt, we will use that label rather than the broader 
“restitutionary damages”. 
 
3. Account of profit from breach of contract 
 
3.1 General principles 
 
 
3 See Rohan Havelock, ‘Restitutionary damages for breach of contract’ [2011] 7 NZLJ 
243, and the discussion of negotiating damages below. 
4 “Disgorgement” is an alternative term. 
Contract-breakers are rarely required to give up profits that they make from breaching a 
contract, as long as they have compensated the innocent party for any losses. This is 
because, as stated in the seminal case of Robinson v Harman: 
 
The rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by reason of a 
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed.5 
 
As Lord Reed observed in One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris-Garner:6  
The courts will not prevent self-interested breaches of contract where the 
interests of the innocent party can be adequately protected by an award of 
damages. Nor will the courts award damages designed to deprive the contract 
breaker of any profit he may have made as a consequence of his failure in 
performance. Their function is confined to enforcing either the primary 
obligation to perform, or the contract breaker’s secondary obligation to pay 
damages as a substitute for performance (subject, according to the decision in 
Attorney General v Blake, to a discretion to order an account of profits in 




Attorney-General v Blake8 is both the leading authority on, and a rare successful claim 
for, an award of an account for profit from breach of contract. Blake was a UK spy who 
breached his contract by disclosing state secrets to the USSR. His treachery was 
discovered and he later served over four years in prison for breaching the Official 
Secrets Act 1911 (UK). 
 
Blake wrote an autobiography in 1989. The publisher promised significant 
sums: £50,000 instalments on signing the contract, on delivering the manuscript and on 
publication. The Attorney-General sued to try prevent Blake profiting from his 
treachery. For various reasons beyond the scope of this piece, the most viable way to 
prevent Blake profiting from publication was to sue Blake for breach of contract and 
seek an account of profit. The essence of the claim was that Blake had breached his 
contract by becoming a double agent and later publishing his autobiography; and that 
 
5 (1848) 1 Exch 850, 855. 
6 [2018] UKSC 20 (Supreme Court (SC)). 
7 ibid [35]. 
8 [2001] 1 AC 268 (House of Lords (HL)). 
the appropriate remedy was to make him give up the profits that he was to make from 
the book. 
 
A majority of the House of Lords agreed with Lord Nicholls that an account of 
profit could be awarded for breach of contract, and that Blake was a case where such an 
award ought to be made. Lord Nicholls stated that an account of profit should be 
awarded only in exceptional cases where loss-based damages did not recognise the 
plaintiff’s interest in the contract. He held that there was no fixed rule for determining 
when that would be the case. Rather, a holistic evaluation of the contract and the 
circumstances was necessary. As a general guide, he suggested that an account of profit 
may be appropriate where the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in preventing the 
defendant’s profit-making activity. 
 
As to why Blake was such a case, Lord Nicholls considered that the Crown had a 
legitimate interest in preventing Blake from profiting from his disclosure of Official 
Information. The reasons included: the context of the security and intelligence services 
and the value of disincentivising security officers from disclosing sensitive information, 
that Blake’s obligation not to disclose secrets was close to a fiduciary obligation (where 
account of profits is a more common remedy), and that the significant sums Blake was to 
be paid for the book were a direct result of his treacherous breach. 
 
3.3 Wrotham Park and Negotiating Damages 
 
Lord Nicholls suggested in Blake that the case of Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside 
Homes Ltd9 ‘shines, rather as a solitary beacon, showing that in contract as well as tort 
damages are not always narrowly confined to recoupment of financial loss.’10 In 
Wrotham Park, a developer built houses in breach of a restrictive covenant. The court 
refused to grant an injunction to comply with the covenant, which would have required 
demolishing the houses. However, the court also considered that to grant no sum, or 
nominal damages, would be unjust. Instead, the court ordered the developer to pay a 
sum equal to what they would have had to pay to negotiate a release from the covenant. 
That sum was calculated based on five per cent of the developer’s anticipated profit.  
 
At first glance, Wrotham Park may appear to be an account of profit (albeit for a 
breach of covenant rather than a breach of contract), but this is not so. The majority 
judgment in the recent United Kingdom Supreme Court case Morris-Garner11 stressed 
 
9 [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Chancery Division (Ch)).  
10 Attorney General v Blake (n 8) 283.  
11 Morris-Garner  (n 6).  
that it is a head of compensatory damages called “negotiating damages”.12 The label 
reflects the method of imagining what the developer would have had to pay in a 
negotiated release of the covenant as a way of attaching a value to the plaintiff’s loss.13 
That hypothetical profit is featured in the calculation does not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that the award is an account of profit. 
 
Morris-Garner also allows us to revisit Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises 
Inc14 where the Court of Appeal endorsed the idea that an account of profit can be 
awarded for breach of contract, and described Blake as ‘a new start in this area of law’.15 
In Experience Hendrix, PPX licensed certain Jimi Hendrix recordings, in breach of an 
agreement with Hendrix’s estate. Counsel for the complainant, without conceding that 
no losses had been suffered, admitted that he had no evidence to quantify those losses. 
The court estimated the losses suffered by considering the royalties that would 
hypothetically have been given to the claimant if they had agreed to relax the 
prohibition on licensing, and awarded damages accordingly. This should be seen as an 
award of “negotiating damages” and not an account of profit.16 
 
4. Nice Place 
4.1 The Facts of Nice Place 
 
The landlord and tenant entered into a tenancy agreement with respect to a unit in an 
apartment building in Wellington. The agreement included that: 
The tenant shall not assign or sublet the tenancy (including Airbnb and other 
temporary rentals platforms) without the landlords written consent.17 
 
Airbnb is an online platform advertising peer-to-peer short-term 
accommodation. It is increasingly popular as an alternative to the traditional hospitality 
 
12 The label was first used by Lord Neuberger in Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire 
Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 430 (Court of Appeal, Civil Division (CA Civ)) [22]. 
13 Morris-Garner (n 6) [30]. 
14 [2003] EWCA Civ 323 (CA Civ). 
15 ibid [16]. 
 
16 See Morris-Garner (n 6) [85]-[90]. 
17 Nice Place Property Management Ltd v Paterson [2018] NZTT Wellington 4115779 [6]. 
industry with increasingly commercialised vendors. Its popularity causes controversy 
around its economic and social effects.18 
 
The landlord became suspicious that the tenant had been subletting the 
premises on Airbnb, and arranged for an associate to book the unit on Airbnb. The 
booking details matched the tenant’s, and the landlord put it to the tenant that he was 
renting the premises on Airbnb. Shortly afterwards, the tenant purported to cancel the 
tenancy for safety reasons, and left the premises. 
 
4.2 Nice Place – decision  
 
The landlord initially brought a claim to the Tenancy Tribunal. The tenant did not 
appear before the Tribunal, or provide submissions to the later District Court hearing. 
The Tribunal found that the tenant had abandoned the property, and considered that 
the landlord had provided compelling evidence that the tenant had sublet the property 
in breach of the lease. The Tribunal accepted the landlord’s submissions that an account 
of profit was appropriate, and considered that the award should be based on net rather 
than gross profit so as to capture the tenant’s true profit. The profit was thus 
approached as: revenue (payments received from subleasing on Airbnb) minus 
expenses (rent to the landlord plus a nominal sum for administration and the cost of 
maintaining the property in the state required to list it on Airbnb).19 Additional awards 
were also made for rent arrears, door replacement, filing fee reimbursement, and 
statutory exemplary damages20 for abandonment, subletting, and replacing locks. 
 
The landlord appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the District Court on the basis 
that the Tribunal had failed to calculate profit correctly. The Court considered that, 
while the Tribunal was correct to seek to determine net rather than gross profit in 
relation to the sublease, the Tribunal had made two errors in calculation, which, 
combined, resulted in a figure less than half of what it should have been.21 
 
18 ‘Airbnb’s legal troubles: what are the issues?’ The Guardian International Edition 
<www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-what-are-the-
issues> accessed 21 May 2019. 
19 Nice Place Property Management Ltd v Paterson (n 17)[41]-[42]. 
20 Which the Tribunal has a statutory power to award–Residential Tenancies Act 1986, s 
77. 
21 Nice Place (n 2)  [9]-[11]. The Tribunal’s errors were to (i) deduct revenue from 
expenses rather than vice versa; and (ii) treat rent paid during the entire six month 
duration of the lease as an expense, rather than just the days while the property was 
being sublet. 
With respect to whether an account of profit should have been awarded at all, 
the District Court observed correctly that, given Blake, an account of profit from breach 
of contract is possible.22 The Court awarded an account of profit, stating: 
 
One can rightly view the breach of contract as cynical. The term breached was as 
clear as a bell. It is obvious from the figures in this case that a tenant could make 
several hundred dollars profit each week simply by renting the apartment and 
then subletting it through Airbnb continuously in blatant breach of the tenancy 
agreement. The maximum amount of exemplary damages under s 44 of the 
Residential Tenancies Act is the inadequate sum of $1, 000. That would be 
covered by four nights of subletting. There is also a line of authority pre-dating 
Attorney-General v Blake in which restitutionary damages have been allowed for 
the wrongful use of land.23 
 
 
5. Analysis of the award in Nice Place 
5.1 Inconsistent with the case law 
 
To put it bluntly, the Court’s rationale for the award of an account of profit in Nice Place 
does not square with Lord Nicholls’s discussion in Blake as to when such an award 
might be appropriate. While the Court focused on the features that could be said to 
make the tenant’s conduct more morally blameworthy, Lord Nicholls focused on 
whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the defendant from making 
a profit. 
 
The difficulty with turning to the cynical nature of the tenant’s conduct to justify 
an account of profit is that the moral blameworthiness of the defendant in breaching a 
contract is normally irrelevant for the law of contract in New Zealand. The Court of 
Appeal expressly rejected the availability of punitive damages for breach of contract in 
Paper Reclaim.24  
 
 
22 ibid [8]. 
23 ibid. 
24 [2006] 3 NZLR 188 (CA) [180]-[183]. We would also note that Lord Hobhouse 
dissented in Blake on the basis that the Crown’s claim on Blake’s profits was 
essentially punitive and not compensatory. 
The strongest support for the Court’s rationale is found in the English High Court 
case Esso Petroleum v Niad Ltd.25 In that case, the court awarded an account of profits for 
a knowing, deceptive and fundamental breach of a commercial contract. That breach 
could also be described as cynical, but the High Court does not use that language, 
focusing rather on the seriousness of the breach. Thus, Esso Petroleum should not be 
seen as providing support for the proposition that a cynical breach justifies an account 
of profit.26  
 
Exemplary damages are awarded in tenancy cases only because the Residential 
Tenancies Act allows it. Where the statutory maximum award of exemplary damages 
seems inadequate to respond to the tenant’s wrongdoing, it cannot be correct to subvert 
the principles of contract law damages to achieve a punitive purpose that New Zealand 
Courts have expressly rejected.  
 
The pre-Blake line of authority that the Court refers to, citing Butterworth’s Laws 
of New Zealand27 is based on the principle that a wrongful user of a plaintiff’s land or 
goods can be made to pay a reasonable sum for their improper use. The first point we 
wish to make is that these cases should be understood as cases about remedies for the 
tort of trespass, and thus should not be the first port of call for resolving questions about 
the application of principles of contract law remedies. The second is that the award of a 
“reasonable sum” for proper use is much closer to a “negotiating damages” approach, 
and will not always justify a full account of profit.   
 
Therefore, the Court’s reasoning is inconsistent with the authorities on when an 
account of profit from breach of contract can be awarded. The Tenancy Tribunal 
decision unhelpfully does not mention Blake, instead relying on a decision on account of 
profit in the context of breach of fiduciary duty.28 We will now go on to consider 
whether an account of profits could be justified. The following discussion presumes that 
the Tribunal and District Court were correct that an account of profit in contract law is 
available for the net profit following from breach.29 References to ‘profit’ below thus 
generally mean net profit. 
 
25 [2001] EWHC 6 (Ch). 
26 See further Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution  (3rd edn, Oxford 
Scholarship Online 2015). As Virgo notes at 482, cynical breach is not exceptional, a 
cynical breach can be an efficient breach, and that a breach is cynical is not a 
sufficient reason to provide a gain-based remedy.  
27 M Pawson, ‘Non-Compensatory Damages’ in The Laws of New Zealand (LexisNexis, 
2018) paras 52-53. 
28 Nice Place Property Management Ltd (n 17) [38]; Stewart Benson Residential Tenancy 
Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters 2018) 63. 
29 It is clear that that is the case in relation to an account of profit following a breach of 
fiduciary duty (see Adlam v Savage [2016] NZCA 454 at [30]. To require the 
 
5.2 The case for account of profits for tenants sub-letting in breach 
 
The strongest argument of an account of profit for tenants sub-letting in breach 
that we can put forward is that the purpose of a no-subletting clause is to establish that 
profiting from lease of the land is the exclusive preserve of the landlord. That is, the 
lease provides the landlord with a legitimate interest in preventing the tenant from 
subletting and, in addition, a legitimate interest in preventing the tenant from profiting 
from subletting. The only way to protect the latter interest is by awarding an account of 
profit. 
 
The most obvious objection to this argument is that, if it were to be accepted, 
then awards of account of profit for tenants sub-letting in breach would be an 
established practice. Yet Blake and Esso are the sole cases awarding an account of profits 
for breach of contract.30 This absence of an established body of case law for awards of 
accounts of profit for sub-letting is, by itself, a near-fatal flaw for the argument that the 
award in Nice Place can be reconciled with the case law. 
 
Furthermore, making a tenant give up their profit would arguably undermine 
the doctrine of efficient breach that, as the England and Wales Law Commission put it: 
[C]ontracting parties should have available the option of breaking the contract 
and paying compensatory damages, if they are able to find a more remunerative 
use for the subject matter of the promise.31 
 
The idea of efficient breach does not exist solely to benefit breaching parties–it 
facilitates more productive use of society’s resources. Thus, awards such as the one in 
Nice Place can be opposed on the grounds of economic efficiency.  
 
The existence of Airbnb offers landlords a choice–they can try to secure a long-
term tenant paying regular rent, or take the riskier option and hope for regular Airbnb 
visitors paying at a higher rate. Allowing a landlord to both have a regular tenant and 
claim any profits from sub-letting on Airbnb is essentially allowing them to have their 
cake and eat it too. If the tenant has taken the risk of listing a property on Airbnb, along 
 
defendant to give up their gross rather than net profit would be punitive rather than 
restitutionary, and contract law is not punitive, as discussed below. 
30 See Virgo (n 26) 478. 
31Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (Law Com No 
247, 1997) para 1.72. The Court of Appeal in Paper Reclaim (n 24) at [180] state that 
they were influenced by the Report. 
with the risk of liability, arguably they also should be the ones to receive the profit–it 
would be unjust for the landlord to receive the profit as a windfall.  
 
5.3 Is Airbnb a special case?   
 
If the case for awards of accounts of profit for sub-leasing in breach is, in general, not 
strong, perhaps there is something special about Airbnb that requires a different 
response. The argument could go something like this: One concern that has been raised 
about Airbnb is that it provides an incentive for landlords to list properties that would 
otherwise be used as long-term residential housing on Airbnb for short-term visitors.32 
This reduces the housing supply, which is socially undesirable.33 Residential tenants 
sub-leasing the property on Airbnb is another manifestation of this same problem. 
Making tenants give up any profit made from sub-leasing in breach of their lease 
counteracts the incentive provided by Airbnb and is desirable from a public policy 
perspective. 
 
This argument provides a rationale for the award in Nice Place that is grounded 
in the social consequences of the breach, rather than its cynical nature. However, that is 
precisely why the argument must fail–it is alien to contact law to award a plaintiff 
additional damages for non-compensatory public policy grounds.34 
 
 
32 See Sarah Holder ‘The Airbnb Effect: It’s Not Just Rising Home Prices’ [2019] Citylab 
<www.citylab.com/equity/2019/02/study-airbnb-cities-rising-home-prices-
tax/581590/> accessed 21 May 2019. 
33 For example, a report prepared for the Queenstown-Lakes District Council concluded 
that ‘Airbnb has made a significant encroachment on the Queenstown- Lakes rental 
pool and made finding accommodation for residents substantially more difficult.’ 
(‘Measuring the Scale and Scope of Airbnb in Queenstown-Lakes District’ 
(Infometrics, November 2017)3 
<www.qldc.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Planning/District-Plan/PDP-Stage-2/Section-
32-Stage-2/Updated-Infometrics-Report-Measuring-Airbnb-in-Queenstown-Lakes-
District.pdf > accessed 21 May 2019 ).  
34 Contract law might limit damages that can be awarded on public policy grounds, for 
example refusing to award “cost of cure” damages that would constitute economic 
waste (see Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 (House of Lords (HL)) and the 
rule against penalties (see Cavendish v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 [243]). However, 
there are no cases where contract law increases the award of damages on public 
policy rather than compensatory grounds. 
5.4 Can the result in Nice Place be achieved through negotiating damages? 
 
If an account of profit is not justified, then perhaps the award in Nice Place can be 
explained as actually being an award of negotiating damages. In Morris-Garner, Lord 
Reed specifically identifies a ‘right to control land’ as the sort of right the breach of 
which can result in ‘an identifiable loss equivalent to the economic value of the right’ 
that can lead to negotiating damages.35 Furthermore, the case satisfied the three 
preconditions for negotiating damages given by the Singaporean Court of Appeal in 
Turf-Club Auto Emporium Pte Ltd v Yeo Boong Hua:36 orthodox compensatory remedies 
are unavailable, there has been a breach of a negative covenant, and it is not totally 
irrational or unrealistic to imagine that the parties could have negotiated for the release 
of the covenant. 
 
Not only do the facts of Nice Place fit with the recent case law for negotiating 
damages, but the device of the hypothetical rational bargain provides a suitably loss-
focused methodology for valuing the landlord’s loss of control over their property that 
can still take into account profit. Let us imagine, then, a hypothetical negotiation that 
fixes a quantum to the landlord’s waiver of the no-sublease clause. We can see two 
approaches.  
 
The first is that the landlord would agree on waiver in exchange for a share of 
the profits. The split must be rational for both tenant and landlord. The landlord’s share 
must therefore be less than 100%, but probably higher than the 5% in Wrotham Park - 
perhaps one third. This approach is readily applicable in a case like Nice Place where the 
tenant made a profit. 
 
The second is to decide upon a notional increase in rent that does not depend on 
the tenant actually making a profit. This approach may be more applicable where the 
sublease does not make a profit, such as where the tenant is seeking to subsidise their 
rent while on holiday. Any award on this basis is likely to be modest and may, in 






35 See Morris-Garner (n 6)  [93]. 
36 [2018] SGCA 244 (CA) [268]. 
6 Conclusion 
 
The orthodox position is that an account of profit from breach of contract is available 
only in exceptional cases. Nice Place is not such a case and accordingly the court should 
not have awarded an account of profit. However, in cases of sub-leasing in breach, a 
court could award negotiating damages as a way of determining the quantum of 
damages required to compensate a landlord for their loss. Using the device of the 
hypothetical negotiation, the court could potentially award the landlord a sum less than, 
or greater than, the profit that the tenant actually made, although we think a modest 
share of any profit is the most likely and reasonable outcome. The possibility of an 
award of negotiating damages (or an account of profit, for that matter) could also serve 
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